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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the question of how to dene the core
when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on
dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a nite sequence
of exogenously specied TU-games. Three dierent core concepts are
presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak
sequential core. The dierences between the concepts arise from dif-
ferent interpretations of protable deviations by coalitions. SuÆcient
conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general
and of the weak sequential core for the case of two players. Sim-
plifying characterizations of the weak and strong sequential core are
provided. Examples highlight the essential dierence between these
core concepts.
Keywords: cooperative games, dynamic games, core.
JEL classication: C71, C73.

Department of Economics, University at Albany, SUNY, Albany, NY 12222. E-mail:
L.Kranich@albany.edu.
y
Departamento de Econom

ia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. E-mail:
Perea@eco.uc3m.es.
z
Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200
MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. E-mail: H.Peters@ke.unimaas.nl.
1
1 Introduction
The canonical representation of a cooperative game, the characteristic func-
tion, describes the payos available to each coalition of players. The simplest
and most common interpretation of such a game is that it pertains to a sin-
gle interaction among the players. However, many, if not most, cooperative
endeavors occur more than once or even repeatedly over time.
A few papers have begun to lay the foundation for a theory of coopera-
tive games played in dynamic settings, or dynamic cooperative games. The
eort to develop a general theory of such games is complicated by the fact
that various new issues arise in a dynamic context, and each may require
a somewhat dierent treatment. In particular, whereas a standard, static,
game species the set of players and the characteristic function, in a dynamic
setting the population of players might change over time, or, given the set
of players, the characteristic function might change either as a result of ex-
ogenous or endogenous forces.
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Typically, a solution to a dynamic game will
exploit intertemporal linkages rather than simply apply a standard solution
at each point in time. Moreover, the game itself may depend on the solution
at each stage.
Rather than attempt to develop a single, overarching framework that
would encompass all possibilities, the strategy adopted in this paper is to
present a particular class of dynamic cooperative games and to focus on the
extension of a particular solution concept, namely, the core. However, in
contrast to static games it is not obvious how to dene the core in a dynamic
setting. Specically, there are various ways in which one might formulate
the notion of a \protable deviation." Here we explore three dierent inter-
pretations, each of which gives rise to a dierent notion of the core. After
introducing the alternative core concepts, we investigate conditions ensuring
their nonemptiness, and we consider the relationship between the various
concepts.
Before discussing the core concepts, we briey describe some of the key
elements of a dynamic cooperative game. First, we will abstract from changes
in the player set. Instead, our focus will be on nite horizon games in which at
1
Rosenthal (1990a,1990b) considered the possibility of changing the player set over
time, while keeping the worths of the original coalitions xed. His study focuses on the
monotonicity of solutions, that is, whether all of the original players gain with the inclusion
of additional players.
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every stage the same players face an exogenously specied cooperative game
with transferable utility. Typically, a solution to the dynamic model will
specify a stream of payos for each player. This might involve exactly solving
each stage game or, if it is possible to trade or transfer payos across periods,
then it may be possible to relax the instantaneous resource constraints. In
either case, it is essential that players have the means to evaluate payos at
dierent points in time. Hence, included in the specication of a dynamic
game will be the players' intertemporal preferences or utility.
Another important aspect of dynamic games is that the (stage) game
and/or solution at any point in time might depend on the history of play
up to that point, that is, they may be subject to endogenous inuences.
This was the subject of a recent paper by Filar and Petrosjan (2000), who
considered dynamic cooperative games where each stage game may depend
on the payos obtained in earlier periods. The focus of their study was on
the issue of \time consistency" of solutions to the stage games.
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However, as
mentioned above, here we abstract from endogenous inuences and take the
sequence of stage games to be given.
In addition to the papers cited above, various authors have addressed
these or related issues often in the context of economic examples. For in-
stance, Gale (1978), Becker and Chakrabarty (1995), and Koutsogeras (1998)
considered core concepts for certain intertemporal economies. Predtechen-
ski et al. (2001) considered both time and uncertainty in their study of the
core of two-period economies with incomplete information. Finally, Munro
(1979) considered Nash bargaining and the core in a dynamic model of op-
timal resource management, and Shalev (1995) formulated a repeated Nash
bargaining model to explain loss aversion.
Turning back to the denition of the core, intuitively, in this context the
core should capture those situations in which at each stage the grand coalition
is formed, its worth is distributed among the players and no coalition has
a protable deviation. But in determining a protable deviation, should
coalitions be required to deviate at the start of the game and for all time, or
can they deviate at a later stage? Should such a deviation itself be stable or
are unstable deviations also to be considered? The three concepts we discuss
provide dierent answers to these questions.
The rst concept, termed the classical core, assumes that coalitions plan-
2
Strotz (1955).
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ning to split o, do so from the beginning. It is not possible, therefore,
for coalitions to separate from the grand coalition after having cooperated
during the rst stages. The classical core may thus be viewed as a static
concept since it does not really depend on the time structure in the game.
This is reected by the fact that the classical core coincides with the core of
an induced static cooperative game with nontransferable utility.
In the strong sequential core coalitions are allowed to deviate at any stage
of the game, but done so in one period, they must do so in all remaining
stages as well. The papers by Gale (1978) and Becker and Chakrabarti
(1995), mentioned above, present similar core concepts for the special case of
a monetary economy and a capital accumulation model, respectively. Also
Koutsougeras (1998) presents a core concept in this spirit in a two-period
economy with asset markets and dierential information. For two-period
economies with uncertainty and possibly asset markets, Predtechenski et al.
(2001) study the strong sequential core.
In both the classical and strong sequential cores, deviations are not re-
quired to be stable. In other words, a coalition can deviate from the grand
coalition and propose a distribution of its worth at each stage which, in turn,
could be blocked by some subcoalition in the future. It is known that for
static cooperative games this dierence is inessential (Ray, 1989), since al-
lowing only \credible" deviations (i.e. deviations which cannot be blocked
by any subcoalition) does not enlarge the set of core allocations. In a dy-
namic setup, however, the focus on credible deviations does have an impact
on the core concept. Payo streams which distribute the worth of the grand
coalition at every stage are said to be in the weak sequential core if they are
robust against all credible deviations. Clearly, the strong sequential core is
contained in both the classical core and the weak sequential core. It is shown
by an example that there is no such logical relationship between the classical
and weak sequential core: both cores may be nonempty but have an empty
intersection.
With these dierent core concepts in hand, we then turn to two important
issues. Can we nd conditions on the stage games and the players' preferences
which guarantee a nonempty core? And, is there an easy way to characterize
core allocations, at least in some special cases? The last question is especially
relevant for the weak sequential core, since its recursive denition of credible
deviations makes it somewhat hard to handle.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide basic de-
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nitions. Section 3 introduces the classical core concept and provides suÆcient
conditions on the stage games and preferences to ensure its nonemptiness.
In brief, balancedness of the stage games together with quasiconcavity of
preferences guarantee that the classical core is nonempty. An example shows
that this condition is not necessary. In Section 4 we rst describe the strong
and weak sequential core concepts; we provide a characterization of weak se-
quential core allocations|which is used to prove an existence result for the
two-player case|and we illustrate the concepts by examples. In the last part
of this section, we investigate the dierent core concepts for two special pref-
erence classes: symmetric linear preferences and lexicographic preferences.
Section 5 contains brief concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide preliminary denitions as well as some well known
facts about the core. In addition we dene the notion of a dynamic transfer-
able utility game.
2.1 TU-games
A game with transferable utility or briey a TU-game is a pair (N; v), where
N := f1; 2; : : : ; ng is the set of players and v : 2
N
! IR
+
assigns to each
coalition S  N
3
its nonnegative worth v(S), with the convention that v(;) =
0, and such that v(S) > 0 for at least one coalition S. Usually we simply
write v instead of (N; v). The central question in a TU-game is how to
distribute the worth v(S) among the members of S if the coalition is formed.
Such a distribution is also called a (payo ) allocation. For convenience we
consider only nonnegative games, but allocations, in general, may contain
negative components. The core of a TU-game v is the set
C(v) := fx 2 IR
N
: x(N) = v(N) and x(S)  v(S) for all S 2 2
N
nf;gg,
where x(S) denotes the sum
P
i2S
x
i
.
A collection of coalitions B  2
N
nf;g is balanced if there are positive real
numbers 
S
for every S 2 B such that
P
S2B:i2S

S
= 1 for every i 2 N . A
3
The symbol  means `inclusion' and the symbol  means `strict inclusion'. Vector
inequalities are denoted , >, and , <.
5
TU-game v is balanced if
P
S2B

S
v(S)  v(N) for every balanced collection
B. According to the well known result of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley
(1967), a TU-game has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced.
2.2 NTU-games
A game without transferable utility or briey an NTU-game is a pair (N; V )
where V (S)  IR
N
for each coalition S, and V (;) = ;. Usually we write V
instead of (N; V ). Often the following additional conditions are imposed on
an NTU-game V :
(N.1) for all S 6= ;, V (S) is nonempty and closed,
(N.2) if x 2 V (S) and y
i
 x
i
for all i 2 S, then y 2 V (S),
(N.3) for every i 2 N there is an m
i
2 IR with V (fig) = fx 2 IR
N
: x
i
 m
i
g,
and V (N) \ fx 2 IR
N
: x
i
 m
i
for all i 2 Ng is compact.
The core of an NTU-game V , denoted by C(V ), is the set V (N)n[
SN
intV (S).
(Here `int' denotes `interior'.) An NTU-game V is balanced if \
S2B
V (S) 
V (N) for every balanced collection B. Scarf (1967) proved that if V satises
(N.1){(N.3) and is balanced then it has a nonempty core (see also Kannai,
1992).
2.3 Dynamic TU-games
Let T be a natural number and let v = (v
1
; v
2
; : : : ; v
T
) be a sequence of
TU-games with the same set of players. Let u = (u
i
)
i2N
be a prole of
utility functions for the players. Here, u
i
: IR
T
! IR is a function assigning
to every payo stream x
i
= (x
1
i
; : : : ; x
T
i
) for player i some utility u
i
(x
i
).
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that the utility functions u
i
are continuous and strictly increasing in each coordinate, and that each u
i
is
time separable (Koopmans, 1960). The last assumption means that for every
stage t, every pair (x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
); (~x
1
; : : : ; ~x
t 1
) and every pair (y
t
; : : : ; y
T
);
(~y
t
; : : : ; ~y
T
) we have:
u
i
(x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
; y
t
; : : : ; y
T
)  u
i
(x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
; ~y
t
; : : : ; ~y
T
)
6
if and only if
u
i
(~x
1
; : : : ; ~x
t 1
; y
t
; : : : ; y
T
)  u
i
(~x
1
; : : : ; ~x
t 1
; ~y
t
; : : : ; ~y
T
):
In words, the evaluation of future allocation streams does not depend on the
history up to that point. Time separability will enable us to dene utility
functions from any moment t = 1; : : : ; T on, independent of the preceding
allocation stream (see Section 4.1).
Not all of these assumptions are needed for every result in the sequel. The
assumption of time separability will be needed when we discuss the weak and
strong sequential cores in Section 4.
One simple way to interpret the utility function u
i
is to think of the
payos in a static TU-game as money: then u
i
represents the evaluation of
streams of money. Alternative interpretations are possible, depending on the
situation. E.g., utility might be additive|possibly with discounting|over
time.
The pair   = (v; u) is called a dynamic TU-game. A feasible allocation
stream for a coalition S in   is a sequence y
S
= (y
1
; : : : ; y
T
) 2 IR
ST
such
that y
t
(S) = v
t
(S) for every t = 1; : : : ; T . (Note that bold-face symbols
denote time indexed vectors.) For S = N , we omit the `N ' and write y
rather than y
N
. Let Z
 
(S) denote the set of feasible allocation streams for
S in  . Also, for y
S
2 Z
 
(S), we write u(y
S
) in place of (u
i
(y
i
))
i2S
.
For a dynamic TU-game   = (v; u) and a nonempty coalition S, we dene
the set V
 
(S) by
V
 
(S) := fx 2 IR
N
: for some y
S
2 Z
 
(S), x  u(y
S
)g:
With V
 
(;) := ;, the pair (N; V
 
) is an NTU-game satisfying conditions
(N.1), (N.2) and (N.3). We refer to V
 
as the NTU-game associated with  .
V
 
represents the situation where coalitions cooperate in every stage of the
game.
3 The classical core
The classical core of a dynamic TU-game   = (v; u), denoted by C( ) or
C(v; u), consists of those allocation streams that generate utility proles in
the core of the associated NTU-game V
 
, that is,
C( ) := fy = (y
1
; : : : ; y
T
) 2 IR
NT
: y 2 Z
 
(N) and u(y) 2 C(V
 
)g:
7
In this section we investigate conditions under which the classical core is
non-empty. Here, the specic time structure does not play a role, and all
results would obviously hold without the assumption of time separability.
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In our rst result we establish directly that the classical core is nonempty
provided the core of each stage game is nonempty as well. The proof as-
sociates a dynamic TU-game with an intertemporal exchange economy in
which the worth of the grand coalition must be allocated in each period.
Nonemptiness of the classical core follows from the existence of a competi-
tive equilibrium in such a context. It is interesting to note that, whereas the
core of an exchange economy results from an application of game theory to
economics, here we solve a game theoretic problem by employing tools from
economics.
Theorem 1 Let   = (v; u) be a dynamic TU-game satisfying:
(i) C(v
t
) 6= ; for every t = 1; : : : ; T ,
(ii) u
i
is quasiconcave for every i 2 N .
Then C( ) 6= ;.
Proof. First, we construct an articial \exchange economy" in which the
vector v(N) = (v
1
(N); : : : ; v
T
(N)) is to be allocated among the n agents,
and the preferences of the agents are represented by their respective util-
ity functions u
i
(y
i
). We then identify a suitable \initial allocation," and
show that a \competitive equilibrium" from the initial allocation is in C( ).
Specically, we claim that any y 2 C(v
1
)  C(v
T
)  IR
NT
would serve
as a suitable initial allocation.
Let y
Æ
denote such an allocation. Under the assumptions on u
i
, a compet-
itive equilibrium from y
Æ
exists: recall that the utility functions are strictly
increasing, and since by assumption v
t
(S) > 0 for some S  N and C(v
t
) 6= ;,
v
t
(N) > 0. Let y

2 IR
NT
denote an equilibrium allocation and p

the sup-
porting prices. Note that p

> 0. We need only show that y

2 C( ).
By way of contradiction, suppose y

=2 C( ). Then there exists S  N
and some y
S
2 Z
 
(S) such that u
i
(y
i
) > u
i
(y

i
) for all i 2 S, and
P
i2S
y
i
=
4
If the specic time structure does not play a role, then an alternative formal interpre-
tation of the periods 1; : : : ; T is as states of nature. With this interpretation, the classical
core corresponds to the ex ante core, i.e., before the uncertainty is resolved.
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v(S). Since the utility functions are strictly increasing, it must be the case
that for all i 2 S, p

y
i
> p

y

i
. Hence, p


P
i2S
y
i
= p

v(S) > p


P
i2S
y

i
.
However, since y

is an equilibrium allocation, p

 y

i
= p

 y
Æ
i
for all i 2 S.
Summing over S, p


P
i2S
y

i
= p


P
i2S
y
Æ
i
. Since y
Æ
2 C(v
1
)      C(v
T
),
P
i2S
y
Æ
i
 v(S). Hence, p


P
i2S
y

i
 p

 v(S), which is a contradiction. 2
Our second existence result is slightly more general. We establish that under
the same conditions as in Theorem 1 the NTU-game associated with   is
balanced. Nonemptiness of the core then follows by the result of Scarf (1967)
since this NTU-game satises conditions (N1){(N3).
Theorem 2 Let   = (v; u) be a dynamic TU-game satisfying:
(i) C(v
t
) 6= ; for every t = 1; : : : ; T ,
(ii) u
i
is quasiconcave for every i 2 N .
Then V
 
is balanced.
Proof. Let B be a balanced collection with weights 
S
for every S 2 B. Let
x 2
T
S2B
V
 
(S). It is suÆcient to show that x 2 V
 
(N). For every S 2 B
take vectors y
S
= (y
1;S
; : : : ; y
T;S
) (t = 1; : : : ; T ) as in the denition of V
 
(S)
in Section 2. Dene Y 2 IR
NT
by
Y
i
:=
X
S2B:i2S

S
(y
1;S
i
; : : : ; y
T;S
i
),
for every i 2 N . By the quasiconcavity of u
i
, we have x
i
 u
i
(Y
i
) for all
i. Hence, it suÆces to show that Y = (Y
1
; : : : ;Y
n
) is feasible for the grand
coalition. Now
X
i2N
Y
i
= (
X
S2B

S
X
i2S
y
1;S
i
; : : : ;
X
S2B

S
X
i2S
y
T;S
i
)
= (
X
S2B

S
v
1
(S); : : : ;
X
S2B

S
v
T
(S))
 (v
1
(N); : : : ; v
T
(N));
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where the inequality follows from balancedness (Bondareva-Shapley) of the
TU-games v
t
. This shows that Y is feasible for the grand coalition and,
hence, x 2 V
 
(N). 2
The following example illustrates that, while it is suÆcient that the stage
games have nonempty cores, this is by no means necessary for the dynamic
game to have a nonempty core.
Example 1 Let T = 2, N = f1; 2g, v
1
(f1g) = v
2
(f2g) = 2, v
1
(f2g) =
v
2
(f1g) = 5, and v
1
(f1; 2g) = v
2
(f1; 2g) = 6:5. Then C(v
1
) = C(v
2
) = ;.
Let u
i
(x
1
i
; x
2
i
) = x
1
i
x
2
i
for i = 1; 2, and   = (v; u).
5
Then C( ) 6= ; and it is
given by
C( ) = f((x
1
1
; x
2
1
); (x
1
2
; x
2
2
)) : x
1
1
= x
2
1
; x
1
2
= x
2
2
= 6:5  x
1
1
;
p
10  x
1
1
 6:5 
p
10g:
2
The fact that in Example 1 and in many other examples (see below) the
classical core of the dynamic game is nonempty in spite of the fact that
the stage TU-games have empty cores is caused by the possibility of implicit
utility transfers between periods. In order to capture this idea we will present
another existence result on the classical core in which these utility transfers
are formalized in a specic sense.
Let   = (v; u) be a dynamic TU-game. For every nonempty coalition S
and every  2 IR dene
V

u
(S) := fx 2 IR
N
: for every i 2 S there is a y
i
= (y
1
i
; : : : ; y
T
i
)
2 IR
T
such that
P
i2S
P
T
t=1
y
t
i
=  and x
i
 u
i
(y
i
)
for every i 2 Sg.
Note that V

u
(S) does not depend on v, but it does depend on u. It consists
of the set of those utility allocations that can be obtained by distributing
the amount  among the players in S. Let (v(S)) be the minimal value of
5
These utility functions satisfy all of our assumptions only for positive allocations,
which are the only ones that are relevant in this example. Alternatively, one may take for
instance utility functions u
i
(x
1
i
; x
2
i
) =  e
 x
1
i
  e
 x
2
i
, which satisfy all of our assumptions
for all possible allocations but are slightly less easy to work with.
10
 for which V

u
(S)  V
 
(S). Note that (v(S)) 
P
T
t=1
v
t
(S). For possible
reference we state the following observation as a theorem. In this theorem
we dene an NTU-game
~
V such that for the grand coalition the individually
rational part of the feasible set is contained in that of V
 
, and for each smaller
coalition the feasible set contains that of V
 
. This is done in a tight way by
distributing xed amounts among the coalitions. These xed amounts are
at most equal to what each coalition could generate if it had the possibility
to pool its worth over all time periods. Thus, it tries to capture the idea of
transfers between periods.
Theorem 3 Let   = (v; u) be a dynamic TU-game. Dene the NTU-game
~
V by
~
V (S) := V
(v(S))
u
(S) for S 6= N and
~
V (N) := V
~
u
(N), where
~ := maxf : 8x 2 IR
N
[x 2 V

u
(N) and x =2 int(V
 
(fig) 8i 2 N
) x 2 V
 
(N)]g:
Then C(
~
V ) 6= ; implies C( ) 6= ;.
Proof. By denition,
~
V (S) = V
(v(S))
u
(S)  V
 
(S) for S 6= N , while
~
V (N)\
fx 2 IR
N
: 8i 2 N [x =2intV
 
(fig)]g  V
 
(N). From this the theorem follows.
2
For this result to be useful one has to know when the NTU-game
~
V has a
nonempty core. More generally, let  
0
= (w; u) be a `trivial' dynamic game,
i.e., T = 1. Then the assumption of strictly increasing utility functions
implies C( 
0
) = C(w).
Example 2 Consider again the game in Example 1. In this case
(v(f1g)) = (v(f2g)) = 2
p
10, ~ = 13. The resulting game
~
V is the game
V
 
0
where  
0
= (w; u) with w(f1g) = w(f2g) = 2
p
10 and w(f1; 2g) = 13.
Thus, C( 
0
) = C(w) 6= ;, and therefore by Theorem 3 C( ) 6= ;. 2
Example 3 Consider the two-period three-player game   = (v; u) dened
by v
1
(f1; 2g) = 4, v
1
(f2; 3g) = 2, v
2
(f1; 2g) = 2, v
2
(f2; 3g) = 4, v
1
(N) =
v
2
(N) = 2:9, and v
1
(S) = v
2
(S) = 0 otherwise; and u
i
(x
1
i
; x
2
i
) = x
1
i
x
2
i
for
i = 1; 2; 3 (cf. footnote 5). Then v
1
and v
2
are not balanced (and neither is
v
1
+ v
2
). In this case (v(S)) = 2
p
8 for S = f1; 2g and S = f2; 3g, and
~ = 5:8. The game
~
V is derived from the TU-game w with w(f1; 2g) =
11
w(f2; 3g) = 2
p
8, w(N) = 5:8, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. The game w is
balanced, hence (w; u) has a nonempty core, and by Theorem 3 the dynamic
game   = (v; u) has a nonempty classical core. 2
4 The weak and the strong sequential core
First, denitions of core concepts will be proposed that capture the time
structure of a dynamic game. An alternative description of one of these,
the weak sequential core, is provided by Lemma 1. Theorem 4 provides
an existence result for the weak sequential core in the case of two players.
In Section 4.2 relationships between the three core concepts or the absence
thereof are illustrated by examples. The last two sections are devoted to
special cases where preferences are linear and symmetric, or lexicographic,
respectively.
4.1 Denitions
Since every utility function u
i
is assumed to be time separable, there is
a utility function u
t
i
: IR
T t+1
! IR for each stage t such that for every
(x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
) and every pair (y
t
; : : : ; y
T
); (~y
t
; : : : ; ~y
T
) we have:
u
i
(x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
; y
t
; : : : ; y
T
)  u
i
(x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
; ~y
t
; : : : ; ~y
T
)
if and only if
u
t
i
(y
t
; : : : ; y
T
)  u
t
i
(~y
t
; : : : ; ~y
T
):
It is therefore possible to dene the core of subgames. The subgame starting
at stage t is the dynamic cooperative game  
t
= v
t
:= ((v
t
; : : : ; v
T
); (u
t
i
)
i2N
):
The core of the subgame  
t
is dened as the classical core of the dynamic
cooperative game  
t
:
Let   = (v; u) be a dynamic TU-game and let x be an allocation stream.
By x
t
we denote the allocation stream from time t on, i.e., x
t
= (x
t
; : : : ; x
T
).
More generally, x
t
may denote an allocation stream from time t on.
Denition 1 A deviation by S  N at time t from x is a feasible allocation
stream y
t
= (y
t
; : : : ; y
T
) 2 (IR
S
)
T t+1
for the coalition S such that u
t
i
(y
t
i
) >
u
t
i
(x
t
i
) for all i 2 S.
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Note that by dening a deviation in this way we implicitly assume that a
coalition, once it deviates, it deviates for the rest of the time.
Denition 2 The strong sequential core of   = (v; u) is the set of feasible
allocation streams x for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has
a deviation.
Remark 1 Note that x is in the strong sequential core of   = (v; u) if, and
only if, at every stage t; the continuation stream x
t
= (x
t
; : : : ; x
T
) is in the
(classical) core of the subgame  
t
= ((v
t
; : : : ; v
T
); (u
t
i
)
i2N
). Therefore, the
existence of a strong sequential core allocation implies the nonemptiness of
all these classical cores.
We denote the strong sequential core by SSC( ): In its denition, we allow
coalitions S to deviate by allocation streams y
t
which, themselves, can be
improved upon in the future by subcoalitions of S. The following denitions
lead to a weakening of this core concept by putting an additional requirement
on deviations.
Denition 3 A deviation y
t
as in Denition 1 is credible if there is no S
0
 S
and a time t
0
 t such that S
0
has a deviation at t
0
from y
t
, i.e., a feasible
allocation stream (y
0t
0
; : : : ; y
0T
) for S
0
with u
t
0
i
(y
0
t
0
i
) > u
t
0
i
(y
t
0
i
) for all i 2 S
0
.
Denition 4 The weak sequential core of   = (v; u) is the set of feasible
allocation streams x for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has
a credible deviation.
We denote the weak sequential core by WSC( ). Obviously, the strong
sequential core is always a subset of the weak sequential core. One might
argue that the denition of the weak sequential core is too restrictive, since
it would be natural to require a deviation by a coalition S
0
as in Denition
3 to be credible at its turn. It is easy to show, however, that existence of a
deviation by S
0
implies the existence of a credible deviation. For suppose that
S
0
at t
0
has a deviation y
0
t
0
from y
t
that is not credible. We may assume that
S
0
itself does not have a deviation from this deviation (otherwise continue
with a deviation from which S
0
itself does not have a deviation). Then there
is a coalition S
00
 S
0
that has at time t
00
 t
0
a deviation y
00
t
00
from y
0
t
0
.
If this deviation is credible then it is obviously also a credible deviation
13
from x. Otherwise we can repeat the argument, possibly until we end up at
one-person coalitions, which always have a credible deviation if they have a
deviation. Thus, for the weak sequential core it does not make a dierence
if we would add this additional requirement.
6
The weak sequential core can be characterized in a simple way. For a
TU-game (N; v) and a coalition S  N the restriction of v to S is denoted
by (S; v). For a dynamic game v the notation (S;v) similarly denotes the
restriction of the game to S at every moment t.
Lemma 1 Let v be a dynamic game, and x a feasible allocation stream for
N . Then the following two statements are equivalent.
(a) x = (x
1
; x
2
; : : : ; x
T
) 2 WSC(v),
(b) x
2
= (x
2
; : : : ; x
T
) 2 WSC(v
2
) and there are no S  N and alloca-
tion stream (y
1
; y
2
; : : : ; y
T
) such that y
1
(S) = v
1
(S), (y
2
; : : : ; y
T
) 2
WSC(S;v
2
) and u
i
(y
i
) > u
i
(x
i
) for all i 2 S.
Proof. For the implication (a))(b) we only still have to show that if an
allocation stream (y
1
; y
2
; : : : ; y
T
) as in (b) would exist, then there would also
exist a credible deviation, thus contradicting (a). But this is obvious be-
cause if (y
1
; y
2
; : : : ; y
T
) is itself not credible, then we can always nd another
credible deviation at t = 1, by an argument analogous to the one following
Denition 4. For the implication (b))(a) we similarly only have to show
that there is no credible deviation at t = 1, but this is immediate. 2
Note that this lemma claries the essentially recursive nature of the weak
sequential core. This will be seen again in the examples that follow below.
First we provide an existence result for the weak sequential core in the case
of two players. For this result we use the following observation.
Lemma 2 Let (v; u) be a dynamic cooperative game and for every t 2
f1; : : : ; Tg let u
t
i
be the induced utility function for allocation streams in the
subgame v
t
: Then for all x
t
= (x
t
;x
t+1
) and y
t
= (y
t
;y
t+1
) with with x
t
i
 y
t
i
and u
t+1
i
(x
t+1
i
)  u
t+1
i
(y
t+1
i
) it holds that u
t
i
(x
t
i
)  u
t
i
(y
t
i
).
6
This is analogous to equality of core and so-called modied core as shown in Ray
(1989).
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Proof. Follows directly from the time separability and monotonicity of the
utility functions. 2
Theorem 4 Let   = (v; u) be a dynamic cooperative game with two players
and with C(v
t
) 6= ; for every t = 1; : : : ; T . Then WSC( ) 6= ;.
Proof. For every t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg; let IR(v
t
) be the set of those alloca-
tion streams x
t
in v
t
that are feasible for the grand coalition and for which
u
t
i
(x
t
i
)  u
t
i
(v
t
(fig); : : : ; v
T
(fig)) for both players i. Let X
t
= f(x
t
1
; x
t
2
) 2
IR
2
: x
t
1
+ x
t
2
= v
t
(N)g be the set of feasible allocations for the grand coali-
tion at stage t: For every set A of allocation streams in v
t
, let PO(A) be
the set of Pareto optimal allocation streams in A: By Lemma 1, it may be
veried easily that
WSC(v
T
) = C(v
T
);
WSC(v
t
) = IR(v
t
) \ PO(X
t
WSC(v
t+1
))
for all t < T . We show by induction on t that WSC(v
t
) is nonempty and
compact for all t:
By assumption, C(v
T
) is nonempty. Since C(v
T
) is also compact, we have
that WSC(v
T
) is nonempty and compact.
Now, let t < T; and assume that WSC(v
t+1
) is nonempty and com-
pact. By continuity of the utility functions, we know that IR(v
t
) and
PO(X
t
 WSC(v
t+1
)) are both compact, and hence it remains to show
that IR(v
t
) \ PO(X
t
WSC(v
t+1
)) is nonempty. Let y
t+1
2 WSC(v
t+1
)
be arbitrary. Let y
t
= ((v
t
(f1g); v
t
(N)  v
t
(f1g));y
t+1
) 2 X
t
WSC(v
t+1
).
Let z
t
2 X
t
 WSC(v
t+1
) be such that u
t
1
(z
t
1
)  u
t
1
(y
t
1
) and u
t
2
(z
t
2
) =
max(fu
t
2
(x
t
2
) : x
t
2 X
t
 WSC(v
t+1
) and u
t
1
(x
t
1
)  u
t
1
(y
t
1
)g: Then, by
construction, z
t
2 PO(X
t
 WSC(v
t+1
)): We prove that z
t
2 IR(v
t
):
By construction, u
t
1
(z
t
1
)  u
t
1
(y
t
1
): By denition, y
t
= ((v
t
(f1g); v
t
(N)  
v
t
(f1g));y
t+1
) with y
t+1
2 WSC(v
t+1
)  IR(v
t+1
) and hence u
t+1
1
(y
t+1
1
) 
u
t+1
1
((v
t+1
(f1g); : : : ; v
T
(f1g):
By Lemma 2, u
t
1
(z
t
1
)  u
t
1
((v
t
(f1g); : : : ; v
T
(f1g)):
On the other hand, u
t
2
(z
t
2
)  u
t
2
(y
t
2
). By denition, y
t
= ((v
t
(f1g); v
t
(N) 
v
t
(f1g));y
t+1
): Since C(v
t
) is nonempty, it holds that v
t
(N)   v
t
(f1g) 
v
t
(f2g): By construction, y
t+1
2 WSC(v
t+1
)  IR(v
t+1
) and hence
u
t+1
2
(y
t+1
2
)  u
t+1
2
((v
t+1
(f2g); : : : ; v
T
(f2g): By Lemma 2,
it follows that u
t
2
(y
t
2
)  u
t
2
((v
t
(f2g); : : : ; v
T
(f2g):We may thus conclude that
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ut
2
(z
t
2
)  u
t
2
(v
t
(f2g); : : : ; v
T
(f2g)), and hence
z
t
2 IR(v
t
)\PO(X
t
WSC(v
t+1
)) =WSC(v
t
): This completes the proof.
2
Example 5 below shows that Theorem 4 does not hold for more than two
players.
4.2 Examples
From the denition, it is clear that the strong sequential core is always con-
tained in the classical core. Moreover, the strong sequential core is always a
subset of the weak sequential core, since the former allows for a more gen-
eral class of deviations and is therefore more restrictive. Between the weak
sequential core and the classical core, there is no logical relationship. It is
even possible for both sets to be non-empty but disjoint, as is illustrated by
the following example.
Example 4 Let N = f1; 2g and T = 2. Let the stage games be given by
v
1
(f1g) = 8; v
1
(2) = 2; v
1
(f1; 2g) = 10;
v
2
(f1g) = 2; v
2
(2) = 8; v
2
(f1; 2g) = 10:
Let the utility functions be
u
i
(x
1
i
; x
2
i
) = x
1
i
x
2
i
for both i (cf. footnote 5).
This dynamic game can be represented by an Edgeworth box, in which
the axes correspond with the two stages t = 1; 2 and at each stage, a total
amount of 10 is distributed between the two agents (Figure 1). Although in
principle allocations with negative amounts are allowed these do not play a
role here.
Classical core. The classical core corresponds with the eÆcient and in-
dividually rational allocation streams in the Edgeworth box. The eÆcient
allocation streams are the streams x = ((x
1
1
; 10   x
1
1
); (x
2
1
; 10   x
2
1
)) with
x
1
1
= x
2
1
; represented by the diagonal line in Figure 1. The individual ratio-
nality constraints are given by
x
1
1
x
2
1
 16 and (10  x
1
1
)(10  x
2
1
)  16;
16
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
x
1
1
x
2
1
(0; 0)
(8; 2)
(10; 0)
(0; 10)
4 6
Figure 1: The Edgeworth box in Example 4
represented by the indierence curves in Figure 1. Therefore,
C( ) = f((x; 10  x); (x; 10  x)) : 4  x  6g:
Weak sequential core. Every allocation stream x = ((x
1
1
; x
1
2
); (x
2
1
; x
2
2
))
in the weak sequential core has the property that (x
2
1
; x
2
2
) = (2; 8); since
otherwise, either coalition f1g or coalition f2g could credibly deviate at the
last stage. But then, also (x
1
1
; x
1
2
) = (8; 2); since otherwise either coalition
f1g or coalition f2g could credibly deviate from x at the rst stage. For
instance, if x
1
1
< 8; then player 1 can credibly deviate at stage 1 since he can
obtain (8; 2) by himself at stage 1 and 2 respectively, which is better than
(x
1
1
; 2) obtained in x. Hence, the only candidate for a weak sequential core
allocation is ((8; 2); (2; 8)).
We show that x = ((8; 2); (2; 8)) is indeed in the weak sequential core. It
is clear that there is no credible deviation at the last stage. Suppose that
there would be a credible deviation at the rst stage. Since players 1 and
2 on their own can never improve upon x; the only possibility remaining is
that f1; 2g could credibly deviate at stage 1. Let y = ((y
1
1
; y
1
2
); (y
2
1
; y
2
2
)) be
such a credible deviation. Then, (y
2
1
; y
2
2
) = (2; 8); since otherwise either f1g
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or f2g could credibly deviate from y at the last stage. However, this implies
that y cannot Pareto dominate x, contradicting the fact that y is a credible
deviation for f1; 2g: Hence,
WSC( ) = f((8; 2); (2; 8))g:
In particular, the classical core and the weak sequential core are both nonempty,
but have an empty intersection.
Strong sequential core. Since the strong sequential core is contained in
both the classical core and the sequential core, the strong sequential core is
empty. 2
Example 5 For the classical core we have seen that, if the stage games all
have a nonempty core and the utility functions are nicely behaved, then the
classical core of the dynamic TU-game is nonempty. In this example we show
that this result is no longer true for the weak sequential core (and therefore
neither for the strong sequential core). Let N = f1; 2; 3g and let T = 2: Let
the stage games be given by
v
1
(fig) = 0 for i = 1; 2; 3; v
1
(fi; jg) = 2 for i 6= j; v
1
(f1; 2; 3g) = 3;
v
2
= v
1
:
Let the utility functions be given by
u
1
(a; b) = ab;
u
2
(a; b) = ab;
u
3
(a; b) = ab
2
:
Hence, both stage games have a nonempty core and Theorem 2 applies (cf.
footnote 5.) We show, however, that the weak sequential core is empty.
Suppose that x = (x
1
; x
2
) would be a weak sequential core element.
Then, x
2
= (1; 1; 1); since otherwise some two-person coalition would ob-
tain less than 2; and this coalition could then credibly deviate at the last
stage. But then, necessarily, x
1
= (1; 1; 1); since otherwise, some two-
person coalition would obtain less than 2 at the rst stage, and this coalition
could then credibly deviate at stage 1. However, f1; 3g can credibly deviate
from ((1; 1; 1); (1; 1; 1)) at stage 1 by choosing a Pareto optimal allocation
((y
1
1
; y
1
3
); (y
2
1
; y
2
3
)) dominating ((1; 1); (1; 1)). Hence, the weak sequential core
is empty. 2
18
4.3 Symmetric linear preferences
In this subsection, the preferences are assumed to be symmetric and linear.
Specically, every player i attaches utility x
1
i
+    + x
T
i
to a payo stream
x
i
= (x
1
i
; : : : ; x
T
i
). A dynamic TU-game can therefore be denoted by   = v.
In this case, for the classical core of  , we simply have C( ) = C(v),
where v is the TU-game v =
P
T
t=1
v
t
.
Before continuing we introduce a few notations. For a collection of coali-
tions B  2
N
nf;g, a coalition S  N and a game (N; v) let
C
B
(S; v) := fx 2 IR
S
+
: x(S) = v(S) and x(T )  v(T )
for every T  S with T 2 Bg:
For a dynamic game v and t = 2; : : : ; T dene
B
t
:= fS 2 2
N
nf;g :WSC(S;v
t
) 6= ;g:
The following lemma characterizes the weak sequential core of a game v.
Lemma 3 Let v be a dynamic game and let x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
T
) be a feasible
allocation stream for the grand coalition N . Then x 2 WSC(v) if and only
if x
t+1
2 WSC(v
t+1
) and x
t
+   + x
T
2 C
B
t+1
(N; v
t
+    + v
T
) for every
t = 1; : : : ; T   1.
Proof. First suppose x 2 WSC(v). By denition of the weak sequential
core it follows that x
t+1
2 WSC(v
t+1
) for every t = 1; : : : ; T   1 (cf. Lemma
1). Let t 2 f1; : : : ; T   1g xed and suppose, contrary to what we wish to
prove, that x
t
(S) +    + x
T
(S) < v
t
(S) +    + v
T
(S) for some S 2 B
t+1
.
Choose an arbitrary allocation stream (y
t+1
; : : : ; y
T
) 2 WSC(S;v
t+1
). For
every i 2 S dene y
t
i
:= x
t
i
+
P
T
s=t+1
(x
s
i
  y
s
i
) +  where  is chosen such
that y
t
(S) = v
t
(S), hence jSj =
P
T
s=t
y
s
(S)  
P
T
s=t
x
s
(S) =
P
T
s=t
v
s
(S) 
P
T
s=t
x
s
(S) > 0. If y
t
= (y
t
; : : : ; y
T
) is a credible deviation for S at stage t,
then we are done because this contradicts x 2 WSC(v). Otherwise, there is
a coalition S
0
 S which can credibly deviate from y
t
through an allocation
stream z
t
. Since
P
T
s=t
z
s
i

P
T
s=t
y
s
i
>
P
T
s=t
x
s
i
for all i 2 S
0
the coalition
S
0
would have a credible deviation from x
t
as well, again a contradiction (cf.
Lemma 1).
Next, suppose that the allocation stream x satises the conditions in the
lemma. Then a credible deviation can only be possible at t = 1 for a coalition
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S for which WSC(S;v
2
) 6= ;, i.e., S 2 B
2
. For such a coalition, however,
x
1
(S) +   + x
T
(S)  v
1
(S) +   + v
T
(S), implying that by deviating this
coalition can never improve. Therefore x 2 WSC(v). 2
The allocation y
t
for coalition S constructed in the proof of Lemma 3 may
have negative components: some players may accept a negative momentary
payo at time t because they are compensated later.
Direct reference to the weak sequential cores of subgames can be avoided,
as follows.
Theorem 5 Let v be a dynamic game and let x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
T
) be a feasible
allocation stream for the grand coalition N . Then x 2 WSC(v) if and only
if x
T
2 C(v
T
) and x
t
+    + x
T
2 C
B
t+1
(N; v
t
+    + v
T
) for every t =
1; : : : ; T   1.
Proof. Every condition of the form x
t
2 WSC(v
t
) occurring in Lemma 3
can, by the same lemma, be unraveled into the conditions x
s
2 WSC(v
s
) for
every s = t + 1; : : : ; T together with x
t
+   + x
T
2 C
B
t+1
(N; v
t
+   + v
T
).
By this the theorem follows. 2
The following lemma provides a recursive denition of the collection B
t
(t =
2; : : : ; T ) which, moreover, avoids reference to the weak sequential core.
Lemma 4 Let v be a dynamic game. Then for every t = 2; : : : ; T   1:
B
t
= fS 2 B
t+1
: C
B
t+1
(S; v
t
+   + v
T
) 6= ;g;
and
B
T
= fS 2 2
N
nf;g : C(S; v
T
) 6= ;g:
Proof. The statement about B
T
is obvious. For t = 2; : : : ; T   1 denote by
X
t
(S) the set of allocations that are feasible for coalition S at time t. We
rst prove the following
Claim: fS 2 2
N
nf;g : there exists (x
t
: : : ; x
T
) 2 X
t
(S)WSC(S;v
t+1
) with
P
T
=t
x

2 C
B
t+1
(S; v
t
+   + v
T
)g = fS 2 B
t+1
: C
B
t+1
(S; v
t
+  +v
T
) 6= ;g.
Proof of Claim: The inclusion from left to right is obvious. Now suppose that
C
B
t+1
(S; v
t
+   + v
T
) 6= ; and WSC(S;v
t+1
) 6= ;. Choose x 2 C
B
t+1
(S; v
t
+
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  +v
T
) and
~
y
t+1
2 WSC(S;v
t+1
). Let
~
y
t+1
= (y
t+1
; : : : ; y
T
). Then y

(S) =
v

(S) for all   t + 1, hence
P
T
=t+1
y

(S) =
P
T
=t+1
v

(S). On the other
hand, x(S) =
P
T
=t
v
t
(S), so that x(S)  
P
T
=t+1
y

(S) = v
t
(S). Let
~
x =
(x 
P
T
=t+1
y

; y
t+1
; : : : ; y
T
) 2 X
t
(S)WSC(S;v
t+1
). Then
P
T
=t
~x

i
= x
i
so that
P
T
=t
~x

2 C
B
t+1
(S; v
t
+    + v
T
). This completes the proof of the
claim.
Now
B
t
= fS 2 2
N
nf;g : WSC(S;v
t
) 6= ;g
= fS 2 2
N
nf;g : there exists (x
t
: : : ; x
T
) 2
X
t
(S)WSC(S;v
t+1
) with
P
T
=t
x

2 C
B
t+1
(S; v
t
+   + v
T
)g
= fS 2 B
t+1
: C
B
t+1
(S; v
t
+   + v
T
) 6= ;g
where the rst and last equalities are by denition and the second equality
follows from the Claim. 2
The following theorem presents a description of the strong sequential core.
The simple (cf. Remark 1) proof is omitted.
Theorem 6 Let v be a dynamic TU-game and let x be an allocation stream.
Then x 2 SSC(v) if, and only if, x
t
+   + x
T
2 C(v
t
+   + v
T
) for every
t = 1; : : : ; T .
4.4 Lexicographic preferences
In this subsection for simplicity we conne ourselves to the case T = 2 and
we assume that the players have lexicographic preferences. More precisely,
we assume that every player i either prefers the rst or the second period. If
he prefers the rst period then he prefers (x
1
; x
2
) to (y
1
; y
2
) if either x
1
i
> y
1
i
or x
1
i
= y
1
i
and x
2
i
 y
2
i
. The preference of a player i who prefers the second
period is dened similarly, with the roles of the two periods reversed. These
preferences are not even representable by utility functions but nevertheless
the denitions of classical and strong and weak sequential cores should be
obvious.
We assume in this subsection that only nonnegative allocations are pos-
sible. Without this assumption (or at least an assumption that allocations
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are bounded from below) the classical core would be empty if both types of
players are present: in period one we can have unlimited transfers from play-
ers who prefer period two to players who prefer period one, provided we have
the reverse transfers in period two. Hence, any allocation can be blocked
by a better one. By a similar argument it might also be the case that the
number of credible deviations is reduced but, in general, the consequences of
allowing unbounded allocations for the weak sequential core are less clear.
Assume that (v
1
; v
2
) is a two-period dynamic TU-game with lexicographic
preferences. For every coalition S write S = S
1
[ S
2
where S
i
consists of
those players that prefer period i. Let (x
1
; x
2
) be a feasible allocation stream
for the grand coalition N . Then we have:
Theorem 7 The following two statements are equivalent:
(a) (x
1
; x
2
) 2 WSC(v
1
; v
2
),
(b) x
2
2 C(v
2
) and for all coalitions S = S
1
[ S
2
and all y
2
2 C(S; v
2
), if
y
2
i
 x
2
i
for all i 2 S
2
, then
P
i2S
2
:y
2
i
=x
2
i
x
1
i
 v
1
(S)  x
1
(S
1
).
Proof. First assume (x
1
; x
2
) 2 WSC(v
1
; v
2
). Then x
2
2 C(v
2
) (cf. Lemma
1). Suppose S = S
1
[ S
2
and y
2
2 C(S; v
2
) with y
2
i
 x
2
i
for all i 2
S
2
. Then consider any feasible allocation (z
1
; y
2
) for S with z
1
i
> x
1
i
for
all i 2 S
1
. By Lemma 1 it must be the case that at least one player in
S
2
is worse o than at (x
1
; x
2
). This implies the condition in (b), viz.,
P
i2S
2
:y
2
i
=x
2
i
x
1
i
 v
1
(S)  x
1
(S
1
). For the implication (b))(a), if x
2
2 C(v
2
)
and x
1
(S
1
)  v
1
(S) for all S, then (a) follows by Lemma 1. If x
1
(S
1
) < v
1
(S)
for some S then any improvement for S
1
must distribute at least x
1
(S
1
) in
v
1
among the players of S
1
, but then in any element in C(S; v
2
), by the
implication in (b) at least one player in S
2
must be worse o. 2
The classical core of the two-stage game with lexicographic preferences is
characterized in the following theorem. The proof is left to the reader.
Theorem 8 The following two statements are equivalent:
(a) (x
1
; x
2
) 2 C(v
1
; v
2
),
(b) for all coalitions S = S
1
[ S
2
we have
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(i) either x
1
(S
1
) > v
1
(S)
(ii) or x
1
(S
1
) = v
1
(S) and x
2
(S)  v
2
(S)
(iii) or x
1
(S
1
) < v
1
(S) and x
2
(S
2
) > v
2
(S)
(iv) or x
1
(S
1
) < v
1
(S) and x
2
(S
2
) = v
2
(S) and x
1
(S)  v
1
(S).
As usual (cf. Remark 1) the strong sequential core is the subset of the (clas-
sical) core consisting of those (x
1
; x
2
) with x
2
2 C(v
2
).
This part is conluded with a simple example.
Example 6 Let N = f1; 2g and let v
1
= v
2
be given by v
1
(fig) = v
2
(fig) =
1 for i = 1; 2 and v
1
(N) = v
2
(N) = 10. Suppose player 1 prefers t = 1 and
player 2 prefers t = 2. Then C(v
1
; v
2
) = f(10; 0); (0; 10)g, and
WSC(v
1
; v
2
) = f(x
1
; x
2
)  0 : x
1
1
+ x
1
2
= 10; x
2
1
+ x
2
2
= 10; and
either x
2
1
= 1 and x
1
1
 1 or 1 < x
2
1
< 9 and x
1
1
= 10g:
From this (or directly) it follows that the strong sequential core of this game
is empty. 2
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed several core concepts for dynamic cooperative
nite horizon games, where at each moment a transferable utility game is
played. For the strong and weak sequential cores of such games the emphasis
was on the denitions and examples as well as special cases, since it is not
obvious whether general and useful existence results can be derived. One
interesting avenue for continued research is the application of, in particular,
the weak sequential core concept to other models. Gale (1978, footnote 9), for
example, hints at such an application without further exploring the subject.
The appropriateness of a particular core concept for a dynamic coopera-
tive game depends on the nature of the contracts that can be written in that
particular situation. Roughly, the classical core is appropriate in a situation
where at the beginning of the game a complete contract on the allocation
stream is possible. In a world of more or less incomplete contract possibilities
other concepts such as the sequential cores may be more appropriate.
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This paper is part of a more general research project that aims at de-
veloping solution concepts for dynamic cooperative games. Other work may
concentrate on value-like solutions, such as the Shapley value. A further
interesting avenue in this project deals with the situation where the stage
cooperative game depends on the history of play, as studied in Filar and
Petrosjan (2000). These topics will be subject of future research.
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